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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court of Utah has sole discretion in granting or
denying a petition for writ of certiorari for the review of a
Court of Appeals adjudication.

Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(5).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Issue: Whether the court of appeals erred in its

assessment of defendant's argument that plaintiff breached the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

Review of the

district court's grant of summary judgment is for correctness,
Brown

according no deference to that court's legal conclusions.
v. Moore,

973 P.2d 950, 953 (Utah 1998).

On certiorari review,

the Supreme Court reviews the decision of the court of appeals,
not the decision of the district court.
2007 UT 10, 1 8, 152 P.3d 312.

See Massey

Griffiths,

v.

This issued was presented in the

Petition for Writ of Certiorari at pages 9-14.
2.

Issue: Whether the court of appeals erred in affirming

the district court's award of attorney fees.

The standard of

review on appeal of the amount of a district court's award of
attorney fees is patent error or clear abuse of discretion.
Jensen

v.

Valcarce

Sawyers,
v.

2005 UT 81, 1127, 130 P.3d 325 (citing

Fitzgerald,

961 P.2d 305, 316 (Utah 1998)).

On

certiorari review, the Supreme Court reviews the decision of the
court of appeals, not the decision of the district court.
Massey

v.

Griffiths,

2007 UT 10, 1 8, 152 P.3d 312.
1

See

This issued

was presented in the Petition for Writ of Certiorari at pages 1419.
DETERMINATIVE RULES
Rule 7(f)(2), Utah Rules

of

Civil

Procedure

(f)(2) Unless the court approves the proposed order
submitted with an initial memorandum, or unless otherwise
directed by the court, the prevailing party shall, within
fifteen days after the court's decision, serve upon the
other parties a proposed order in conformity with the
court's decision. Objections to the proposed order shall be
filed within five days after service. The party preparing
the order shall file the proposed order upon being served
with an objection or upon expiration of the time to object.
Rule 56(c), Utah Rules

of

Civil

Procedure

(c) Motion and proceedings
thereon.
The motion, memoranda
and affidavits shall be in accordance with Rule 7. The
judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions of
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A
summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be
rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a
genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of the Case, course and disposition of proceedings.
This is an action for damages in which plaintiff asserts a

claim for breach of contract based upon defendant Carlos Marin's
failure to meet certain "performance guarantees" detailed in the
written contract between the parties.

Mr. Marin does not dispute

that he failed to meet his performance guarantees.

It is Mr.

Marin's contention, however, that plaintiff's prior material

breach of the contract excused him from his performance
guarantees.

Specifically, Mr. Marin contends that plaintiff

breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
inherent in the contractual relationship between the parties when
it failed to cooperate in providing Mr. Marin with the marketing
tools which were necessary in order for Mr. Marin to meet his
performance guarantees.
The trial court granted summary judgment in plaintiff's
favor, rejecting Mr. Marin's defense on the basis that "[i]t is
well settled that the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing cannot be used to impose new, independent duties in a
written agreement."

See Addendum 2.

The trial court also

reasoned that the parol evidence rule barred the testimony which
Mr. Marin offered to prove his claim.
Court of Appeals affirmed.

See Addendum 2.

The Utah

See Addendum 1.

The trial court also awarded plaintiff $43,903 in attorney
fees.

See Addendum 3.

The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed,.

See

Addendum 1.
II.

Statement: of Facts
1. Plaintiff is in the business of manufacturing and selling

therapeutic grade essential oils and wellness supplements.
Historically, plaintiff has sold its products through a network
of individuals who are for the most part practitioners of
alternative medicine, massage therapists, and quasi-naturopath

3

non-licensed wellness enthusiasts.

When plaintiff's

representatives first contacted Mr. Marin, they represented to
Mr. Marin that they desired to increase their company's sales
volume using a mainstream network marketing model, i.e.,
marketing their products through traditional network marketing
sales representatives directly to the individual consumer.
Plaintiff's representatives were aware of the fact that Mr. Marin
had previously built a global network of more than 500,000
distributors for Amway Corporation using a mainstream network
marketing model and they wanted Mr. Marin to accomplish similar
results for plaintiff.

(R. 0126)

2. The parties entered into a Field Advisor to Executive
Board Distributor Agreement on January 12, 2005 (hereinafter the
"Agreement").

(R. 0090)

3. Paragraph 18 of the Agreement provides that "there are no
representations, warranties, or other agreements between the
Parties in connection with the subject matter hereof except as
specifically set forth herein."

(R. 0082)

4. Under paragraph 4 of the Agreement, plaintiff promised to
pay Mr. Marin advance payments of:
$25,000
$25,000
$25,000
$25,000
(R. 0089)

on
on
on
on

execution of the Agreement (12 January 2005);
15 February 2005;
15 March 2005; and
15 April 2005.

5. Under paragraph 3.4 of the Agreement, Mr. Marin agreed
that he would meet the following performance guarantees of
cumulative "auto ship" sales volume by the specified dates:
$5,000 by 15 February 2005;
$30,000 by 15 March 2005;
$100,000 by 15 April 2005;
$300,000 by 15 May 2005;
$600,000 by 15 June 2005; and
$900,000 by 15 July 2005.
(R. 0089)
6. On January 12, 2005, in connection with the execution of
the Agreement, plaintiff paid a $25,000 advance to Mr. Marin.
(R. 0368)
7. By February 15, 2005, Mr. Marin met his $5,000 cumulative
"auto ship" sales volume performance guarantee under paragraph
3.4 of the Agreement.

(R. 0368)

8. Accordingly, on February 15, 2005, plaintiff paid Mr.
Marin another $25,000 advance.

(R. 0368)

9. Mr. Marin was unable to meet his $30,000 cumulative auto
ship sales volume performance guarantee by March 15, 2005 in
accordance with paragraph 3.4 of the Agreement.

(R. 0368)

10. On March 15, 2005, plaintiff paid Mr. Marin another
$15,000 advance.

(R. 0368)

11. Mr. Marin was unable to meet his April 15, 2005
performance guarantee by April 15, 2005.

(R. 0368)

12. Prior to the parties' execution of the Agreement,
plaintiff represented to Mr. Marin that it was nearing completion
5

of a new mainstream marketing website, recruiting DVD, audio CD,
and other marketing materials (hereinafter referred to as the
"marketing tools'7) .

It was understood by both plaintiff and Mr.

Marin that these marketing tools would be necessary in order for
Mr. Marin to be able to meet his performance guarantees under the
Agreement and it was represented to Mr. Marin that they would be
available for use by February 1, 2005. (R. 0126-0125)
13. Unfortunately, while plaintiff repeatedly promised to do
so, it failed to provide Mr. Marin with any of the necessary
marketing tools (except for one mediocre but expensive brochure
which Mr. Marin's distributors were not interested in
purchasing). (R. 0125)
14. On or about February 7, 2005, after plaintiff failed to
provide the marketing tools as promised, Mr. Marin contacted Gary
Young, plaintiff's Chief Executive Officer, and David Stirling,
plaintiffs' Chief Operating Officer, with his growing concerns
about his ability to meet his performance guarantees.

Mr. Young

and Mr. Stirling acknowledged that plaintiff had failed to
perform as promised, assured Mr. Marin that his inability to
satisfy his performance guarantees would not affect his receipt
of the advance payment of $25,000 due February 15, 2005, and
expressed their confidence that the marketing tools would be
ready for Mr. Marin's use by mid-February to early March 2005.
(R. 0125-0124)

15. On or about March 16, 2005, Steve Bentley, plaintiff's
Chief Financial Officer, informed Mr. Marin that due to Mr.
Marin's failure to meet his March 15, 2005 performance guarantee,
plaintiff was considering withholding further payment to Mr.
Marin under the Agreement.

In response, Mr. Marin made it very

clear to Mr. Bentley that his failure to satisfy his performance
guarantee was the unavoidable result of plaintiff's failure to
provide the promised marketing tools, that he could and would
meet his performance guarantees when the tools were provided, and
that he expected plaintiff to continue making payment to him in
accordance with the terms of the Agreement.

Mr. Bentley

acknowledged that plaintiff had failed to perform as promised,
represented that plaintiff anticipated that its website would be
completed within approximately two weeks, and stated that
plaintiff would be making a partial $15,000 payment to Mr. Marin.
(R. 0124)
16. On April 12, 2005, Mr. Marin spoke again with Gary Young
regarding plaintiffs failure to provide the marketing tools.
Mr. Young responded by telling Mr. Marin that he would "get to
the bottom" of the problem and see what he could do.

(R. 0124-

0123)
17. Despite its acknowledgment that it had failed to provide
Mr. Marin with the marketing tools which he needed to do his job,
and despite its requests for Mr. Marin to remain patient while it

7

continued in its efforts to provide the marketing tools,
plaintiff failed to pay Mr. Marin $10,000 of the advance payment
due March 15, 2005 in accordance with paragraph 4 of the
Agreement and failed to make any of the $25,000 advance payment
due to be paid to Mr. Marin on April 15, 2005.

(R. 0123)

18. On April 26, 2005, Mr. Marin telephoned Mr. Stirling
regarding plaintiffs failure to provide the promised marketing
tools.

Mr. Stirling again assured Mr. Marin that they would be

provided soon and again requested that Mr. Marin be patient.

(R.

0123)
19. On May 3, 2007, Mr. Stirling notified Mr. Marin that he
had received an e-mail from Rainmaker Consulting (i.e., "John's
folks") "which indicated they are making progress" on the
website.

Mr. Stirling asked Mr. Marin to "hold tight."

Thus, 49

days after plaintiff stopped making payments to Mr. Marin in
accordance with the Agreement, plaintiff acknowledged that it had
still not provided Mr. Marin with the marketing tools which were
absolutely essential for him to be able to do his job and
requested his continued patience.

(R. 0123)I

20. On or about June 8, 2005, when plaintiff had still not
provided any of the marketing tools which Mr. Marin needed in
order to do his job, Mr. Marin spoke with Mr. Young and informed
him that he believed he had been patient long enough in waiting
for the repeatedly promised marketing tools and that he could no

longer afford to continue to his contractual relationship with
plaintiff.

(R. 0123-0122)

21. The Complaint commencing this action was filed on July
26, 2006.
22.

(R. 0023)
Plaintiff filed its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

on March 21, 2007.

(R. 0105)

Mr. Marin filed his Response to

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Counter-Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment on April 4, 2007.

(R. 0111)

23. Following a hearing held October 1, 2007, the trial
court issued its Order granting plaintiff's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment and denying Mr. Marin's Counter-Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment.

(R. 04 62)

24. On May 27, 2008, plaintiff filed a Motion for Order of
Voluntary Dismissal of Plaintiff's Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth
and Sixth Cause of Action.

(R. 0495)

On that same date,

plaintiff submitted a Proposed Final Judgment and an Affidavit of
Attorneys' Fees and Costs.

(R. 0505)

25. Mr. Marin served his Objection to Plaintiff's Proposed
Final Judgment and Fee Affidavit on June 7, 2008.

However, the

Objection was not filed with the trial court until June 11, 2008.
(R. 0499)
26. On June 12, 2008, the trial court entered a Final
Judgment in which it awarded plaintiff $61,362.43 in compensatory
damages and awarded plaintiff $43,903 in attorney fees.
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(R.

0505)
27. Mr. Marin filed his Notice of Appeal on July 14, 2008.
(R. 0514)
28.

The Utah Court of Appeals filed its MEMORANDUM DECISION

(Not For Official Publication) affirming the trial court's ruling
on September 24, 2009. (See Addendum 1)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS ASSESSMENT OF MR. MARIN'S
ARGUMENT THAT PLAINTIFF BREACHED THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF
GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING.
The trial court granted plaintiff's Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment based upon the undisputed fact that Mr. Marin
failed to meet his "performance guarantees."

In opposing summary

judgment, Mr. Marin does not deny that he failed to meet his
performance guarantees.

Rather, it is Mr. Marin's contention

that plaintiff's prior material breach of its obligation of good
faith and fair dealing excused Mr. Marin from further performance
under the Agreement.
Corp.,

See, e.g.,

Holbrook

v.

Master

Protection

883 P.2d 295, 301 (Utah App. 1994) (one party's material

breach excuses the other party's further performance).
Specifically, Mr. Marin contends that plaintiff's failure to
provide him with the marketing tools which he needed in order to
satisfy his performance guarantees constitutes a prior material
breach of plaintiff's obligation to cooperate with Mr. Marin and
to act consistently with Mr. Marin's justified expectations and
in

with the parties' agreed common purpose, thereby excusing Mr.
Marin from his performance guarantees.

See Rawson

v.

Conover,

2001 UT 24, 1 44, 20 P.3d 876 (a party must act consistently with
the agreed common purpose and the justified expectations of the
other party).
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's rejection of
Mr. Marin's defense, concluding that "*[w]hile a covenant of good
faith and fair dealing inheres in almost every contract, . .. . this
covenant cannot be read to establish new, independent rights or
duties to which the parties did not agree ex ante.'"1

The court

of appeals also agreed with the trial court's conclusion that the
parol evidence rule barred the testimony which Mr. Marin offered
to prove his claim.2
Mr. Marin respectfully submits that the court of appeals
erred in its assessment his argument.

Mr. Marin's testimony was

not offered for the purpose of proving "new, independent rights
or duties" or a "contemporaneous oral agreement."

It was offered

to show the parties' purpose, intentions and Mr. Marin's
justified expectations, which, as discussed below, is in
accordance with this Court's decisions in Brown
P.2d 950, 954 (Utah 1998); St. Benedicts
Hosp.,

Dev.

v.

811 P.2d 194, 200 (Utah 2001)/ and Rawson

Addendum 1 at p. 3.
2

Addendum 1 at p. 3.
11

v.
St.
v.

Moore,

973

Benedicts
Conover,

2001

UT 24, 1 44, 20 P.3d 876, as well as those of other panels of the
See Andolex

court of appeals.

Resources,

Inc.

v.

Myers,

871 P.2d

1041, 1048 (Utah App. 1994).
II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S
AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES.
The trial court's award of attorney fees is unconscionable

and unjustified.

This is a very simple breach of contract case

in which neither party conducted any discovery and which was
decided on summary judgment.

Nevertheless, the trial court

awarded plaintiff $43,903 in attorney fees.

The court of appeals

affirmed the trial court's award on the ground that Mr. Marin's
objection to plaintiff's fee affidavit was filed seven days late
and, therefore, his arguments with respect to the fee award "are
waived on appeal."3
Mr. Marin respectfully submits that the court of appeals
erred in affirming the trial court's award of attorney fees.
"Waiver" is an intentional and voluntary relinquishment of a
known right.

See,

e.g.,

Gifis

Law Dictionary

at p. 222.

Mr.

Marin may have filed his objection to plaintiff's fee affidavit
seven days late.

However, there is nothing which would support

the conclusion that he did so intentionally, much less that he
intentionally and voluntarily relinquished his right to appeal
the attorney fee award.

3

Addendum 1 at p.4.

Further, even if Mr. Marin's objection to plaintiff's fee
affidavit was untimely, the Court of Appeals could still have
considered the issue of fees because the trial court committed
plain error and this case involves exceptional circumstances.
See,

e.g.,

View

Condominium

Owners

Ass'n

104, f 37, 90 P.3d 1042 (citing State

v.

v.

MS'ICO, 2004 UT App

Brown,

856 P.2d 358,

359-60 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)) (appellate courts will generally not
consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal unless the
trial court committed plain error or the case involves
exceptional circumstances).
ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS ASSESSMENT OF MR. MARIN'S
ARGUMENT THAT PLAINTIFF BREACHED THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF
GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING.
Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is premised

on Mr. Marin's breach of contract as alleged in the First Cause
of Action set forth in plaintiff's Complaint.

Specifically,

plaintiff alleges that Mr. Marin breached the Agreement by
failing to meet his "performance guarantees."
In opposing plaintiff's motion, Mr. Marin does not deny that
he failed to meet his performance guarantees.

It is Mr. Marin's

contention that plaintiff's failure to provide him with the
marketing tools which were necessary for him to satisfy his
performance guarantees was a prior material breach of plaintiff s
obligation of good faith and fair dealing which excused Mr. Marin

13

from further performance under the Agreement, and specifically
excused him from his performance guarantees.
v.

Master

Protection

Corp.,

See,

e.g.,

Holbrook

883 P.2d 295, 301 (Utah App.

1994)(one party's material breach excuses the other party's
further performance).
Under Utah law, an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing inheres to all contractual relationships.

See,

Rawson

In order to

v.

Conover,

2001 UT 24, fl 44, 20 P.3d 876.

e.g.,

comply with its obligation of good faith and fair dealing,
"... a party must act consistently Vith the agreed common
purpose and the justified expectations of the other party.'
In analyzing for compliance with the covenant, both the
contract language and the course of dealings between the
parties should be considered to determine the parties'
purpose, intentions, and expectations."

Id.

(quoting St.

Benedicts

Dev. v. St.

Benedicts

Hosp.,

811 P.2d

194, 200 (Utah 2001) (other citation omitted) (emphasis added);
also

Brown

Andolex

v.

Moore,

Resources,

1994)(same).

see

973 P.2d 950, 954 (Utah 1998)(same); and
Inc.

v.

Myers,

871 P.2d 1041, 1048 (Utah App.

Particularly applicable to the case at bar, this

means that "one party may not render it difficult or impossible
for the other to continue performance and then take advantage of
the nonperformance he has caused."
Holt,
Bradley,
Center,

Zion's

Properties,

538 P.2d 1319, 1321 (Utah 1975); see also

Markham

Inc.

v.

v.

2007 UT App 379, 1 18, 173 P.3d 865 (same); and PDQ Lube
Inc.

V. Ruber,

949 P.2d 792, 798 (Utah App. 1997)(same);

see

generally

Gregorson

v.

Jensen,

617 P.2d 369, 373 n.9 (Utah

1980)("parties are obligated to cooperate with each other in good
faith in the performance of a contact").
In his Affidavit submitted in opposition to plaintiff's
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (see paragraphs 12-19 of the
Statement of Facts above), Mr. Marin offered testimony regarding
the parties' course of dealings and conduct for the purpose of
proving the parties' purpose, intentions and Mr. Marin's
justified expectations. (R. 0126-0122)

Mr. Marin's respectfully

submits that his testimony is sufficient to establish issues of
fact as to whether plaintiff failed to act consistently with the
parties' agreed upon common purpose of marketing and distributing
plaintiff's product through a mainstream network marketing model,
whether plaintiff failed to act consistently with Mr. Marin's
justified expectation that plaintiff would provide him with the
marketing tools necessary in order for him to be able to satisfy
his performance guarantees, and whether plaintiff made it
difficult or impossible for Mr. Marin to meet his performance
guarantees and is now attempting to take advantage of the nonperformance which it caused.
The court of appeals, however, affirmed the trial court
rejection of Mr. Marin's defense on the basis that "*[w]hile a
covenant of good faith and fair dealing inheres in almost every
contract, ... this covenant cannot be read to establish new,

15

independent rights or duties to which the parties did not agree
ex ante.'"4

The court of appeals also agreed with the trial

court's conclusion that the parol evidence rule barred the
testimony which Mr. Marin offered to prove his claim: "we reject
Marin's argument that the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing can be used to incorporate extrinsic evidence of a
contemporaneous oral agreement, where the parties' agreement was
integrated and the alleged oral agreement was not part of xthe
express covenants and promises of the contract.'" Addendum 1 at
p. 3 (quoting Seare

v. University

of

Utah

Sch.

of Med.,

882 P. 2d

673, 678 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
Mr. Marin respectfully submits that the trial court's and
the Court of Appeals' conclusions are erroneous.

Mr. Marin's

testimony was not offered for the purpose of proving "new,
independent rights or duties" or a "contemporaneous oral
agreement."

It was offered to show the parties' purpose,

intentions and Mr. Marin's justified expectations.
(A) Mr. Marin is not attempting to impose new, independent:
duties into the parties' Agreement.
The court of appeals was correct in recognizing this Court's
ruling in Oakwood

Village,

LLC v.

Albertsons,

2004 UT 101, 1 45,

104 P.3d 1226, that the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
"cannot be read to establish new, independent rights or duties to

4

Addendum 1 at p. 3.

which the parties did not agree ex ante.'"5

However, the court

of appeals erred in its assessment of Mr. Marin's defense because
it failed to reconcile that ruling with this Court's rulings in
Brown,

St.

Benedict's

Development,

and Rawson,

supra,

that in

analyzing for compliance with the covenant good faith and fair
dealing trial courts should consider not just the contract
language, but also the course of dealings and conduct of the
parties in order to determine their purpose, intentions, and
expectations.
In Brown the Court explained that "[i]n determining whether
a party has breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
we are not limited to an examination of the express contractual
provisions; we will also consider the course of dealing between
the parties."
added).

973 P.2d at 954 (citations omitted)(emphasis

The Brown plaintiffs had purchased all of the stock of

Western Heritage Thrift and Loan pursuant to an agreement which
they entered into with the Utah Department of Financial
Institutions (DFI).

Because the plaintiffs were not infusing new

capital sufficient to meet the minimum requirements under Utah
law, "DFI told plaintiffs that the necessary additional capital
could be supplied by the Utah Industrial Loan Guaranty
Corporation's (ILGC) purchase of $2,000,000 of "net worth
certificates' from Western Heritage, which DFI would recognize as
5

Addendum 1 at p. 3.
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cash equivalents for accounting purposes in meeting
capitalization requirements."

973 P.2d at 952.

Approximately

two years later, the ILGC became insolvent and, as a consequence,
Western Heritage became a failing depository institution because
it was no longer able to use the net worth certificates in
calculating its operating capital.

Following DFI's seizure of

Western Heritage due to its failure to maintain adequate capital,
the plaintiffs filed suit claiming, inter al^a, that "DFI
breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by
taking possession of Western Heritage before the lapse of a
period sufficient to permit them to recover their investment.
Plaintiffs assert[ed] that ... DFI was obligated to continue
crediting the ILGC net worth certificates toward capital
requirements imposed by State law."

973 P.2d at 954.

The trial court granted summary judgment in DFI's favor and
this Court affirmed, explaining the analytical framework for its
decision as follows:
In this case, an examination of the contract language
reveals no express obligation on the part of DFI to allow
plaintiffs to operate Western Heritage for a sufficient
period to recoup their investment. Nor is there any
language which guarantees that DFI will continue to count
the net worth certificates toward capital requirements for
any specific amount of time... Thus, if plaintiffs are to
defeat summary judgment, the course of dealings between the
parties must disclose some other obligation, express or
implied, on the part of DFI which could give rise to a
breach of the covenant of good faith an$ fair dealing.
Id.

(emphasis added).

Because it found nothing in the course of

dealings between the parties which supported the plaintiffs'
defense, the Court affirmed the summary judgment order:
"Because no express or implied obligations of or
representations by DFI indicated that DFI would recognize
the net worth certificates regardless of the ILGC's
financial condition, DFI's eventual decision to discontinue
doing so cannot form the basis of a breach of the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing. A contrary holding would
Establish new, independent rights or duties not agreed upon
by the parties.'"
973 P.2d at 955 (citation omitted)(emphasis added).
In short, the Brown Court clearly recognized that: (1) a
cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing may arise from obligations or representations,
express or implied, which are not found in the language of the
contract itself; and (2) that a cause of action based upon
obligations or representation not found in the language of the
contract itself does not necessarily "establish new, independent
rights or duties not agreed upon by the parties."
Benedicts

Dev.,

supra,

See

also,

St.

811 P.2d at 200 (the Court examined the

"parties' conduct" in finding that the plaintiff had stated a
claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing); and Myers,

supra,

871 P.2d at 1048 (parties' "course of

dealings" failed to establish a breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing).
Whether there has been a breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing is a factual issue, generally
inappropriate for decision as a matter of law.
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Republic

Group,

Inc.

v.

Won-Door

Corp.,

883 P.2d 285, 291 (Utah App. 1994).

Summary judgment is appropriate only where there are no disputed
material facts and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.

Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Brown

950, 953 (Utah 1998).

v. Moore,

973 P.2d

"Because disposition of a case by summary

judgment denies the benefit of a trial on the merits, any doubt
concerning questions of fact, including evidence and reasonable
inferences drawn from the evidence, should be resolved in favor
of the party opposing the motion." Beehive
Brick

Co.,

Brick

Co. v.

Robinson

780 P.2d 827 (Utah App. 1988).

In the case at bar, Mr. Marin respectfully submits that
summary judgment was not appropriate because his testimony
regarding the parties' course of dealing and conduct is
sufficient to establish issues of fact as to: (a) whether
plaintiff failed to act consistently with the parties' agreed
upon common purpose of marketing and distributing plaintiff's
product through a mainstream network marketing model; (b) whether
plaintiff failed to act consistently with Mr. Marin's justified
expectation that plaintiff would provide Mr. Marin with the
marketing tools necessary in order for him to be able to satisfy
his performance guarantees; and (c) whether plaintiff failed to
cooperate in providing the necessary marketing tools thereby
making it difficult or impossible for Mr. Ma^in to meet his
performance guarantees and is now attempting to take advantage of

the non-performance which it caused.
Because there is a dispute as to these material issues of
fact, the court of appeals erred in its assessment of Mr. Marin's
argument that plaintiff breached the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing.
(B)

The parol evidence rule is not implicated because the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing inheres
to all contractual relationships.

Also erroneous is the court of appeals' determination that
the parol evidence rule barred Mr. Marin's testimony regarding
the parties' course of dealings, conduct and justified
expectations.

The parol evidence rule has a "very narrow

application," and operates only to exclude evidence of statements
offered for the purpose of varying or adding to the terms of an
integrated agreement.

Tangren

Family

20, 1 11, 182 P.3d 326 (quoting Hall
Control,

Inc.,

Trust

v.

v. Process

890 P.2d 1024, 1026 (Utah 1995).

Tangren,

2008 UT

Instruments

&

The covenant of

good faith and fair dealing, however, inheres in every contract
as a matter of law.
Albertsons,

Inc.,

See,

e.g.,

Oakwood

Village,

LLC

2004 UT 101, 1 45, 104 P.3d 1226.

v.
Accordingly,

because the covenant was already part of the contract at issue in
this case as a matter of law, it follows that Mr. Marin f s
testimony regarding the parties' purpose, intentions and
expectations was not "offered for the purpose of varying or
adding to the terms of" the contract.
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The parol evidence rule

does not, therefore, operate to bar Mr. Marin's testimony.
II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S
AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES.
(A) The trial court's award of attorney fees is
unconscionable and plainly erroneous. The Court of Appeals'
decision to affirm that award is in conflict with a number
of Supreme Court decisions.
This is a very simple breach of contract case in which

neither party conducted any discovery and which was decided on
summary judgment.

Nevertheless, the trial court awarded

plaintiff $43,903 in attorney fees.

Mr. Marin believes that this

amount is unconscionable and unjustifiable.

The court of

appeals, however, affirmed the trial court's award on the ground
that Mr. Marin's objection to plaintiff's fee affidavit was filed
seven days late and, therefore, his arguments with respect to the
fee award "are waived on appeal."6
At the outset, the court of appeals' conclusion that Mr.
Marin "waived" his arguments with respect to the issue of
attorney fees is clearly erroneous.

"Waiver" is an intentional

and voluntary relinquishment of a known right.
Law Dictionary

at p. 222.

See,

e.g.,

Gifis

Mr. Marin may have filed his objection

to plaintiff's fee affidavit seven days late.

However, there is

nothing which would support the conclusion that he did so
intentionally, much less that he intentionally and voluntarily
relinquished his right to appeal the attorney fee award.
6

Addendum 1 at p. 4.

Mr. Marin respectfully submits that the actual basis for
court of appeals' decision is Mr. Marin's failure to preserve the
issue of attorney fees for appeal.

However, even if Mr. Marin's

objection to plaintiff's fee affidavit was untimely, the court of
appeals could still have considered the issue of fees because the
trial court committed plain error and this case involves
exceptional circumstances.
Ass'n

v. MSICO,

v. Brown,

See, e.g., View

Condominium

Owners

2004 UT App 104, 1 37, 90 P.3d 1042 (citing

State

856 P.2d 358, 359-60 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)) (appellate

courts will generally not consider an issue raised for the first
time on appeal unless the trial court committed plain error or
the case involves exceptional circumstances).
(1)

The trial court failed to make findings of fact
supported by the evidence and appropriate conclusions
of law.

"An award of attorney fees must generally be made on the
basis of findings of fact supported by the evidence and
appropriate conclusions of law."

Cabrera

622, 624 (Utah 1985)(citing Bangerter

v.

v. Cottrell,
Poulton,

103 (Utah 1983))(other citations omitted).
before the Court in Cabrera

694 P.2d

663 P.2d 100,

One of the issues

was whether the trial court committed

plain error in awarding attorney fees without making a finding of
reasonableness.

The Court upheld the award even though the trial

court did not enter findings and conclusions separate from its
order and judgment because the order and judgment itself
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contained findings and legal conclusions, including a finding
that the fee award was reasonable.

694 P.2d at 625.

In the case at bar, however, the trial court did not make
any findings of fact or conclusions of law with respect to
plaintiff's attorney fee request.

And, unlike Cajbrera, there is

no finding of reasonableness in the Final Judgment.
(2)

Plaintiff is not entitled to recover attorney fees
related to its tort and other non-contract claims.

In Utah, attorney fees are recoverable only if authorized by
statute or contract.

Dixie

State

Bank

988 (Utah 1988)(citations omitted).

v. Bracken,

764 P.2d 985,

In the case at bar, an award

of attorney fees is authorized by paragraph 6.1 of the Agreement
between the parties. (R. 10)
In its Complaint, however, plaintiff alleges six causes of
action, entitled in order: (1) Breach of Contract; (2) Unjust
Enrichment; (3) Quantum Meruit; (4) Fraud; (5) Breach of Implied
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; and (6) Negligent
Misrepresentation.

After the trial court granted summary

judgment with respect to the breach of contract claim alleged in
its First Cause of Action, plaintiff voluntarily dismissed its
Second through Sixth Causes of Action.

Accordingly, the only

cause of action with respect to which plaintiff might be entitled
to an award of attorney fees is the breach of contract claim
alleged in the First Cause of Action.

The trial court granted summary judgment in plaintiff's
favor on the breach of contract claim at the conclusion of the
hearing held October 1, 2007.

Yet, plaintiff seeks to recover

tens of thousands of dollars in attorney fees incurred during the
eight months after that date (R. 470-465), nearly all of which
were related either to the tort and non-contract claims alleged
in the Second through Sixth Causes of Action or to litigating
"Defendant's Objection to Plaintiff's Proposed Form of Order" and
"Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider" upon which plaintiff did not
prevail.

(R. 392, 448)

In Jensen

v. Sawyers,

2005 UT 81, 130 P.3d 325, the Court

recognized not only that an award of attorney fees must be based
upon "specific findings of fact," but also that the party
requesting attorney fees must "categorize the time and fees
expended for ^successful claims for which there may be an
entitlement to attorney fees, (2) unsuccessful claims for which
there may be an entitlement to attorney fees had the claims been
successful, and (3) claims for which there is no entitlement to
attorney fees.'" Id.

at 1132 (quoting Foote

v.

Clark,

962 P.2d

52, 54 (Utah 1998).
Noncompliance with these requirements makes it difficult, if
not impossible, for the trial court to award the moving
party fees because there is insufficient evidence to support
the award.
Id.
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In the case at bar, not only did the trial court commit
plain error by not making specific findings of fact, but it did
not have sufficient evidence to support an award of attorney fees
because plaintiff failed to categorize its fee request. (R. 492)
(3)

Plaintiff is not entitled to recover attorney fees in
connection with issues on which it did not prevail.

The trial court committed plain error by awarding plaintiff
attorney fees in connection with matters on which it did not
See

prevail.

Foote

v. Clark,

962 P.2d 52, 57 (Utah 1998)("the

court should not reimburse counsel for time spent pursuing
ungrounded and infeasible theories of recovery); and Gardner
Madsen,

v.

949 P.2d 785, 792 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)(trial court should

make adjustments to fee request so that the prevailing party
"does not recover fees attributable to issues on which he did not
prevail").

Plaintiff seeks thousands of dollars in attorney fees

incurred in litigating "Defendant's Objection to Plaintiff's
Proposed Form of Order" and "Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider."
(R. 470-465)

The trial court, however, sustained Mr. Marin's

objections to plaintiff's proposed form of order (R. 392) and
denied plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider.

(R. 448)

Mr. Marin

respectfully submits that it was plainly erroneous for the trial
court to reimburse plaintiff for time spent on ungrounded and
infeasible theories and upon matters on which it did not prevail.

(4)

The award of attorney fees rewards inefficiency.

Calculation of the amount of a reasonable attorney fee is
within the sound discretion of the trial court.
v. Bracken,

764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988).

Dixie

State

Bank

In determining the

amount of a reasonable fee, the trial court may consider, inter
alia, "the difficulty of the litigation, [and] the efficiency of
the attorneys in presenting the case..."

Id.

Cottrell,

This was not a

694 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 1983).

difficult case.

(quoting Cabrera

v.

The only issue which the trial court was

required to determine in order to grant summary judgment was
whether there is a genuine issue of fact as to whether
plaintiff's prior material breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing excused Mr. Marin's performance under the
Agreement.

This was a relatively simple issue which should have

required very little attorney time to address.

It certainly

should not have required tens of thousands of dollars.
Accordingly, if plaintiff did spend that kind of time, it did so
inefficiently and Mr. Marin respectfully submits that the trial
court committed plain error by ordering him to pay for that kind
of inefficiency.
(B) This Case Involves Exceptional Circumstances.
Finally, Mr. Marin respectfully submits that the following
exceptional circumstances would have justified the court of
appeals' consideration of the issue of attorney fees.
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(1) Plaintiff failed to comply with Rule 7.
Plaintiff failed to comply with the time requirements of
Rule 7, URCP, and should not be heard to complain of Mr. Marin's
failure to do so.

Plaintiff filed its Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment on March 21, 2007.

(R. 74)

Mr. Marin timely filed his

Response to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and CounterMotion for Partial Summary Judgment on April 4, 2007.

(R. 119)

Plaintiff, however, did not file its reply/response memorandum
until August 13, 2007, nearly four months late.

(R. 170)

Similarly, the Order granting plaintiff's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment was entered March 26, 2008.

(R. 462)

In

accordance with Rule 7(f)(2), plaintiff should have served a
proposed form of judgment within ''fifteen days after the court's
decision."

The Proposed Final Judgment was not served until May

27, 2008, 44 days late.

(R. 505)

(2) The trial court did not proceed in accordance with
Rule 7.
As the following chronology demonstrates, the trial court
did not proceed in accordance with Rule 7, URCP.
1. The Order granting plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment was entered March 26, 2008.

(R. 462)

That Order,

however, was not a final judgment because it "adjudicat[ed] fewer
than all [of plaintiff's] claims."

See Rule 54(b),

URCP.

2. Accordingly, in order to obtain a final judgment, on May
27, 2008, plaintiff filed the following documents with the trial
court:
Motion for Order of Voluntary Dismissal of Plaintiff's
Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Causes of Action
Order of Voluntary Dismissal of Plaintiff's Second, Third,
Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Causes of Action
Proposed Final Judgment
Affidavit of Attorney's Fees and Costs
(R. 492, 502 and 505)
3. In accordance with Rules 6(a), 6(e), and 7(c)(1), URCP,
Mr. Marin had until June 13, 2008, in which to file his
memorandum in response to plaintiff's Motion for Order of
Voluntary Dismissal of Plaintiff's Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth
and Sixth Causes of Action.
4. Mr. Marin filed his objection to plaintiff's attorney fee
affidavit and to the provision for attorney fees and costs
included in the Proposed Final Judgment on June 11, 2008.

(R.

499)
5. Mr. Marin timely filed his response to plaintiff's Motion
for Order of Voluntary Dismissal of Plaintiff's Second, Third,
Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Causes of Action on June 13, 2008. (R.
507)
6. Plaintiff then filed its Reply in Support of Plaintiff's
Motion for Order of Voluntary Dismissal on June 23, 2008.
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(R.

510)
7. In the meantime, on June 12, 2008, the trial court
prematurely entered the Order of Voluntary Dismissal of
Plaintiff's Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Causes of
Action and the Final Judgment.

(R. 502, 505)

It did so not only

prior to the filing of Mr. Marin's response memorandum, but prior
to the time when Mr. Marin's response memorandum was due, prior
to the filing of plaintiff's reply memorandum, and without either
party having filed a "Request to Submit for Decision" in
accordance with Rule 7(d), URCP.
8. The Proposed Final Judgment does not contain a Rule 54(b)
certification7 and, accordingly, was "subject to revision at any
time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all of the claims
and the rights and liabilities of all the parties." Rule 54(b),
URCP.

The Proposed Final Judgment was, therefore, subject to

revision at any time prior to the entry of the Order of Voluntary
Dismissal of Plaintiff's Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth
Causes of Action.

Because Mr. Marin had until June 13, 2008, in

which to file his memorandum in response to plaintiff's Motion
for Order of Voluntary Dismissal of Plaintiff's Second, Third,

7

"When more than one claim for relief is presented in an
action ... the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as
to one or more but fewer than all of the claims ... only upon an
express determination by the court that there is no just reason
for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of
judgment." Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Causes of Action, and plaintiff then had
until June 23, 2008 in which to file a reply memorandum, the
earliest date upon which Rule 7, URCP, would have authorized the
trial court to enter the Order of Voluntary Dismissal of
Plaintiff's Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Causes of
Action was June 23, 2008.

The Proposed Final Judgment should,

therefore, have been subject to revision under Rule 54(b) at
least through June 23, 2008.

Mr. Marin's objection to

plaintiff s attorney fee affidavit and to the provision for
attorney fees and costs included in the Proposed Final Judgment
was filed 12 days prior to that date on June 11, 2008.

The trial

court could, therefore, have revised the Proposed Final Judgment
in accordance with Mr. Marin's objection if it had proceeded in
accordance with the requirements of Rule 7, URCP.
In short, because neither plaintiff nor the trial court
proceeded in accordance with the requirements of Rule 7, it would
not be reasonable to now hold Mr. Marin strictly to those
requirements.

Accordingly, Mr. Marin respectfully submits that

this case involves exceptional circumstances under which the
court of appeals could have and should have considered Mr.
Marin's arguments with respect to the trial court's attorney fee
award despite Mr. Marin's not having preserved the issue for
appeal.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Marin respectfully requests that
the Memorandum Decision of the court of appeals be reversed and
that this action be remanded to the court of appeals with
instructions for remand to the trial court for a trial on the
merits.
DATED this /j^&y

of March 2010.

orney for Petitioner
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McHUGH, Judge:
Carlos Marin appeals from the trial court's order granting
partial summary judgment in favor of Young Living Essential Oils,
LC (Young Living). Marin had defaulted on the parties' contract
by failing to meet certain "performance guarantees" detailed in
the agreement. On appeal, Marin argues that the trial court
erred by granting summary judgment in favor of Young Living.
Marin also contests the trial court's award of attorney fees and
costs to"Young Living. We affirm.
"An appellate court reviews a trial court's legal
conclusions and ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment for
correctness, and views the facts and all reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party." Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, ^ 6, 177 P.3d 600 (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted).
On appeal, Marin does not deny that he failed to meet the
performance guarantees contained in the contract. Rather, Marin
claims that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment
because there was a material issue of fact relating to whether
Young Living breached its obligation of good faith and fair

dealing. See generally Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c) (stating that a
grant of summary judgment is proper where "there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact") . In support of this claim, Marin
relies on an affidavit he submitted in opposition to Young
Living's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. In his affidavit,
Marin avers that Young Living failed "to provide him with the
marketing tools [that] were necessary for him to satisfy his
performance guarantees." Young Living counters that Marin's
affidavit cannot raise a material issue of fact because it
constitutes parol evidence offered to insert additional terms
into the parties' written agreement.
The parol evidence rule "operates, in the absence of fraud
or other invalidating causes, to exclude evidence of
contemporaneous conversations, representations, or statements
offered for the purpose of varying or adding to the terms of an
integrated contract." Tangren Family Trust v. Tangren, 2008 UT
20, f 11, 182 P.3d 326 (emphasis and internal quotation marks
omitted). "Thus, if a contract is integrated, parol evidence is
admissible only to clarify ambiguous terms . . . ." Id. In
determining the admissibility of parol evidence the court must
begin by "determin [ing] whether the agreement is integrated."
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
An integrated agreement is "a writing . . . constituting a
final expression of one or more terms of an agreement." Id. f 12
(internal quotation marks omitted). "[W]hen parties have reduced
to writing what appears to be a complete and certain agreement,
it will be conclusively presumed, in the absence of fraud, that
the writing contains the whole of the agreement between the
parties." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The Utah
Supreme Court has stated that "we will not allow extrinsic
evidence of a separate agreement to be considered on the question
of integration in the face of a clear integration clause." Id.
1 16.
Here, the agreement signed by the parties includes a
provision titled "Entire Agreement, " which reads, in part,
This Agreement constitutes the entire
agreement between the Parties hereto
pertaining to the subject matter hereof and
supersedes all prior and contemporaneous
agreements and understandings of the Parties,
and there are no representations, warranties,
or other agreements between the Parties in
connection with the subject matter hereof
except as specifically set forth herein.

20080624-CA
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Thus, Marin's agreement with Young Living was integrated because
the parties signed a written contract including a clear
integration clause. See id. Furthermore, Marin makes no claim
that the language of the agreement was ambiguous. Therefore, the
parol evidence rule prohibits the use of extrinsic evidence to
vary or add terms to the parties' integrated agreement. See id.
%18.

Marin argues that the parol evidence rule does not prohibit
the introduction of evidence that Young Living breached the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Marin reasons
that "[b]ecause the covenant was already part of the contract at
issue[,] . . . [his] testimony in support of his claim for breach
of the covenant was not 'offered for the purpose of varying or
adding to the terms of' the contract." "While a covenant of good
faith and fair dealing inheres in almost every contract, . . .
this covenant cannot be read to establish new, independent rights
or duties to which the parties did not agree ex ante." Oakwood
Vill. LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101, f 45, 104 P.3d 1226.
Rather, the covenant is "implied in contracts to protect the
express covenants and promises of the contract." Seare v.
University of Utah Sch. of Med., 882 P.2d 673, 678 (Utah Ct. App.
1994) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Marin reasons that Young Living breached the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing because it failed to provide him
promised marketing tools, but no obligation regarding marketing
tools was made part of the written agreement. Therefore, we
reject Marin's argument that the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing can be used to incorporate extrinsic evidence of
a contemporaneous oral agreement, where the parties' agreement
was integrated and the alleged oral agreement was not part of
"the express covenants and promises of the contract." Id.
Finally, Marin contests the trial court's award of attorney
fees and costs to Young Living. Young Living counters that Marin
waived his arguments on attorney fees and costs on appeal because
his objection was not timely filed in the trial court. "To
preserve an issue for appeal, the appellant must have raised a
timely and specific objection before the trial court. We will
not address an issue if it is not preserved or if the appellant
has not established other grounds for seeking review." H.U.F. v.
W.P.W., 2009 UT 10, fl 25, 203 P.3d 943 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure instructs
that "[o] bjections to [a] proposed order shall be filed within
five days after service." Utah R. Civ. P. 7(f)(2). Young Living
served its Proposed Final Judgment and Affidavit of Attorney[]
Fees and Costs on May 27, 2008. Marin then had five days as

20080624-CA
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provided by rule 7(f) (2), see id., along with an additional three
days following service by mail, see id. R. 6(e), to file his
objection. Marin's objection was not filed until June 11, 2008,
making it untimely, and his arguments, therefore, are waived on
appeal.1
Accordingly, we affirm.

6 jri*
Carolyn^

McHugh, Judge,

WE CONCUR:

William A. Thorne Jr.,
Associate Presiding Judge

Gregory>^.^"T)rme, Judge

1. Marin argues that exceptional circumstances warrant our
consideration of his arguments as to attorney fees and costs
because during the course of the litigation Young Living also
failed to comply with filing deadlines. However, Young Living's
failings do not excuse Marin's untimely filing.

20080624-CA
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3301 N UNIVERSITY AVE
PROVO UT 8 4 604
HONORABLE SAMUEL D. MCVEY
FOURTH DISTRICT, PROVO DEPT
125 N 100 W BX 0470
PROVO UT 84 601
FOURTH DISTRICT, PROVO DEPT
ATTN: KRISTEN ROGERS
125 N 100 W BX 0470
PROVO UT 84601

MAmaA--- %2^r\<zsKur/g/h
Judicial /secretary
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S7AY1 OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY

Barnard N. Madsen (4626)
Scott D.Preston (11019)
FILLMORE SPENCER LLC
3301 North University Avenue
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: 426-8200
Fax: 426-8208
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DEPARTMENT
YOUNG LIVING ESSENTIAL OILS, INC.,
a Utah corporation,

ORDER

Plaintiff,
vs.
Case No. 060402237
CARLOS MARIN, an individual,
Defendant.

Judge Samuel McVey
Division 1

Plaintiff Young Living Essential Oils, LC ("Plaintiff) is a Utah limited liability company.
Defendant Carlos Marin ("Defendant") is an individual who resides in Miami, Florida. The
matter is before the Court on the parties' cross-motions for partial summary judgment.
I. Undisputed Material Facts
The following undisputed facts are taken from the parties' pleadings with citations to the
record omitted.

A.

Valid Contract

After negotiations, Plaintiff, a Utah corporation, executed a written agreement
("Agreement") with Defendant on 12 January 2005.
In their Agreement, Defendant expressly represented and warranted that he had
"significant experience as a Distributor/Leader", had "numerous contacts with potential
Distributor/Leaders" whom he could "bring to the Company and sign as new distributors with
the Company", and had "successful, favorable experience in providing Services such as the
duties as contemplated herein."
Paragraph 18, the last paragraph of their Agreement directly above the signature blocks,
is labeled "Entire Agreement" (underline in original) and states in part:

"there are no

representations, warranties, or other agreements between the Parties in connection with the
subject matter hereof except as specifically set forth herein."
B.

Plaintiffs Obligations

Under paragraph 4 of their Agreement, Plaintiff agreed to pay Defendant advance
payments of
$25,000 on execution of the Agreement (12 January 2005);
$25,000 on 15 February 2005;
$25,000 on 15 March 2005, and
$25,000 on 15 April 2005.
According to their Agreement, these advances and other specified performance bonuses
were to help Defendant devote "all his time and attention into [sic] recruiting additional
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distributors underneath him and training them" and were expressly intended "to entice
[Defendant] to quickly build an organization by devoting the necessary time to it. Also, [they]
will provide him with a quick resource of cash to build the business."
Under paragraphs 4 and 4.1, these advanced amounts were to be offset by any payments
due Defendant for commissions and "Fast Cash" bonuses.
Under paragraph 4.3, Plaintiff gave Defendant a product credit of $5,000 for January
2005, and $5,000 for February 2005 "to be used for samples in attracting new
Distributor/Leaders."
C.

Defendant's Obligations

Under paragraph 3.3 of their Agreement, Defendant agreed to "devote his full time and
attention to recruiting new Distributor/Leaders" to sell Plaintiffs products.
Under paragraph 3.4 of their Agreement, Defendant agreed that he would meet the
following performance guarantees of cumulative "auto ship" sales volume by the specified dates;
$5,000 by 15 February 2005;
$30,000 by 15 March 2005;
$100,000 by 15 April 2005;
$300,000 by 15 May 2005;
$600,000 by 15 June 2005, and
$900,000 by 15 July 2005.
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Paragraph 6.1 of their Agreement provides for Defendant's payment of Plaintiffs "loss
and damage" and "legal fees" arising from "contravention . . . of any of the terms and conditions
imposed on [Defendant] pursuant to this Agreement."
D.

Plaintiffs Performance and Defendant's Breach

On 12 January 2005, in connection with the execution of their Agreement, Plaintiff paid
Defendant a $25,000 advance.
On 15 February 2005, Defendant met his $5,000 cumulative "auto ship" sales volume
performance guarantee under paragraph 3.4 of his Agreement.
Accordingly, on 15 February 2005, Plaintiff paid Defendant another $25,000 advance.
On 15 March 2005, Defendant had failed to meet his $30,000 cumulative "auto ship" sales
volume performance guarantee under paragraph 3.4 of his Agreement.
On 15 March 2005, Plaintiff paid Defendant another $15,000 advance based on
Defendant's representation that he would meet his 15 March 2005 performance guarantee of
$30,000 in cumulative sales volume by 15 April 2005.
On 15 April 2005, Defendant had failed to meet his 15 March 2005 $30,000 (let alone his
15 April 2005 $ 100,000) cumulative "auto ship" sales volume performance guarantee under
paragraph 3.4 of his Agreement.
Through June 2006, Defendant had generated a grand total of less than $36,000 in
cumulative "auto ship" sales volume.
E.

Damages

Plaintiff paid Defendant $65,000.00 in advances.
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In 2005 and 2006, Defendant earned a total of $3,637.57 in commissions from Plaintiff.
Defendant never earned "Fast Cash" bonus payments.
Paragraph 4 of the Agreement states that the "monies advanced to [Defendant] will be
offset by any payments due [Defendant] under the Fast Cash Program as calculated below. Also,
these payments will be offset by any commission payments due [Defendant] each month as
calculated by the standard commission payout plan. . . . If any of the advanced amounts are not
repaid by the commission payouts or Fast Cash at the end of the guaranteed payments, these
amounts will be deducted from any future commission payout. . . ."
II. Discussion
A.

Legal Standards

1. Summary Judgment. Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue
of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P.
Rule 56; see also Billings ex. rel. Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 819 P.2d 803 (Utah 1991).
2.

Contract Interpretation.

"[Interpretation of a contract is a question of law."

Dennis Dillon Oldsmobile, GMC v. Zdunich, 668 P.2d 557, 561 (Utah 1983), citing Morris v.
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 658 P.2d 1199 (Utah 1983).

"A completely integrated

agreement must be interpreted on its face." Ford v. Am. Express Fin. Advisors, Inc., 98 P.3d 15 f
28 (Utah 2004).
3. Material Breach Excuses Nonbreaching Party's Further Performance. "The law
is well settled that a material breach by one party to a contract excuses further performance by
the nonbreaching party." Holbrook v. Master Protection Corp., 883 P.2d 295, 301 (Utah App.
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1994), citing, Saunders v. Sharp, 840 P.2d 796, 806 (Utah App. 1992); Wright v. Westside
Nursery, 787 P.2d 508, 516 (Utah App. 1990).
4. Prejudgment Interest. Prejudgment interest may be recovered where the damage is
complete, the amount of the loss is fixed as of a particular time, and the loss is measurable by
facts and figures. Cornia v. Wilcox, 898 P.2d 1379, 1387 (Utah 1995). "Unless parties to a
lawful contract specify a different rate of interest, the legal rate of interest for the loan or
forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in action shall be 10% per annum." Utah Code Ann.
§ 15-1-1 (2006).
B.

Elements of Proof for a Breach of Contract Claim

To prevail on its breach of contract claim, Plaintiff must prove (1) a valid contract, (2)
performance by Plaintiff, (3) breach by Defendant, and (4) damages. Bair v. Axiom Design,
L.L.C., 20 P.3d 388, 392 1f 14 (Utah 2001).
Each of these elements is undisputed based on the parties' submissions.
C.

Defendant's Claims

However, Defendant claims that his performance was excused because of Plaintiff s prior
material breach of an oral term by failing to provide "marketing tools" by a purported deadline.
Defendant also claims that his assertions concern a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. At oral argument, Defendant's counsel argued and directed the Court's attention to the
Restatement of Contracts, Second § 216, and to FMA Financial Corp. v. Hansen Dairy, Inc., 617
P.2d 327, 329 (Utah 1980) in support of Defendant's position that the contract was not
completely integrated.
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Defendant's claims are without merit.
1.

Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

Defendant's claim of Plaintiff s breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing is misplaced. It is well settled that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
cannot be used to impose new, independent duties in a written agreement. Slicex, Inc. v.
Aeroflex Colorado Springs, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74234 n.l ('The implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing is 'implied in contracts uto protect the express covenants or promises
of the contract."' ... c[T]he doctrine of good faith and fair dealing does not serve to import new
obligations into a contract. It merely controls how the obligations stated within the contract are to
be performed.'").
2.

The Parol Evidence Rule

Defendant's claim that Plaintiff breached a purported oral term necessarily implicates the
parol evidence rule. It is well settled that "the [parol evidence] rule operates, in the absence of
fraud or other invalidating causes, to exclude evidence of contemporaneous conversations,
representations, or statements offered for the purpose of varying or adding to the terms of an
integrated contract." Hall v. Process Instruments & Control 890 P.2d 1024, 1026-27 (Utah
1995) (italics in original) citing inter alia Eie v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 638 P.2d 1190, 1192 (Utah
1981); Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 213-14 (1981).
Under the parol evidence rule, the Court must undertake a two-step analysis. First, is the
parties' Agreement integrated? Second, did Defendant claim ambiguity or fraud?
a. Is the Agreement integrated? "[BJefore considering the applicability of the parol
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evidence rule in a contract dispute, the Court must first determine that the parties intended the
writing to be an integration. To resolve this question of fact, any relevant evidence is
admissible." Hall, 890 P.2d at 1026.
Based on all the relevant evidence submitted by the parties, the Court concludes as a
preliminary matter that the parties intended their Agreement to be a complete integration and the
final expression of their agreement.
The Court's determination is based in part on the express integration provision directly
over Defendant's signature in the Agreement itself which Defendant has neither disputed nor
explained. Although not conclusive, the Court finds this express provision particularly
persuasive.
Further, the Agreement itself sets out in detail the rights and obligations of the parties,
including various deadlines for their performance. It therefore begs the question: if, as
Defendant contends, the purported term that Plaintiff breached was so critical to Defendant's
performance, why was it not included in the parties' Agreement?
Finally, the email communications between Defendant and Plaintiff submitted to the Court
are devoid of any reference by Defendant to Plaintiffs breach of this purported critical term.
The Court finds particularly persuasive an email exchange between Defendant and Plaintiffs
general counsel on February 3, 2005, two days after the deadline Defendant contends that
Plaintiff was to provide promised "marketing tools". Instead of complaining about how
Plaintiffs recent breach would prevent his further performance, Defendant represented that he
could expand Plaintiffs business into several foreign markets. Indeed, In the submissions before
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the Court, there is no written notice of the purported breach to give Plaintiff the contractuallyrequired 10-day opportunity to cure.
The Court notes that oral representations of additional terms have been accepted by other
courts notwithstanding an integration clause in a written agreement. But those cases are most
often in the context of a construction contract where the performance of the parties manifests
their agreement or consent to "extras" beyond a written agreement. Therefore, those cases are
distinguishable.
Further, Defendant's assertions of Plaintiff s representations lack foundation as to the
circumstances including who made the purported representation or representations and when
such representations were made.
In sum, based on all the relevant evidence submitted by the parties, the Court rejects
Defendant's assertions that the parties intended to be bound by terms not found in their written
Agreement and concludes as a threshold matter that the parties' Agreement was integrated.
b. Did Defendant claim ambiguity or fraud?
Nowhere in his pleadings or submissions to this Court did Defendant claim that the parties'
Agreement was ambiguous or that it was induced by fraud. On the contrary, he contended that
the Agreement was-a% "valid contract" but that Plaintiff was the one who breached it.
Thus, in the absence of any claim of fraud or ambiguity, Defendant's assertions offered for
the purpose of adding to the terms of the parties' integrated Agreement must be excluded. Hall,
890 P.2d at 1026-27.
As to Plaintiffs breach of contract claim involving a product credit Plaintiff provided to
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Defendant, Defendant's order of product in excess of that credit, and the amount due to Plaintiff,
the Court finds that there is a dispute as to the material facts. Therefore, the Court denies any
relief to Plaintiff on that portion of its breach of contract claim at this point in the proceedings.
Plaintiffs Remedy
Based on the undisputed facts and as a matter of law (and pursuant to the parties'
Agreement), Plaintiff is entitled to the difference between the advances it paid to Defendant
($65,000.00) and the commissions Defendant earned ($3,637.57). Plaintiff is thus entitled to
damages in the amount of $61,362.43.
Because that damage amount was complete and fixed as of April 15, 2005 and is
measurable by facts and figures, Plaintiff is also entitled to 10% prejudgment interest (simple no
compounded) from April 15, 2005 through October 1, 2007, the date upon which the Court ruled
that the Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment.
Plaintiff is also entitled to post-judgment interest at the statutory rate commencing on the
date this ordered is entered.
Because Plaintiff is the prevailing party herein, it is entitled under the Parties' Agreement
to its attorney fees and costs. Since Plaintiff has outstanding claims that remain to be tried, the
Court defers a ruling on the amount of Plaintiff s attorney fees and costs until the conclusion of
the case and entry of a final judgment.

[ THIS SPACE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK ]
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E.

Conclusion

Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, and Defendant's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment is DENIED.
DATED this

Z^b

day of

/WcK

2007.

THE HONORABLE SAMUEL MCVEY
DISTRICT^OURT JUDGE

S^ottX. Mitchell
Attorney for Defendant
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T H DISTRICT
STATE OF UTAH
UTAH C O U N T Y

Barnard N. Madsen (4626)
Scott D.Preston (11019)
FILLMORE SPENCER LLC
3301 North University Avenue
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: 426-8200
Fax: 426-8208
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DEPARTMENT
YOUNG LIVING ESSENTIAL OILS, INC.,
a Utah corporation,

TROPOSEB-FINAL JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
Case No. 060402237
CARLOS MARIN, an individual,
Defendant.

Judge Samuel McVey
Division 1

WHEREFORE, having heard oral arguments on this matter, having considered pleadings,
prior orders and argument of counsel and pursuant to the Court's Order granting Plaintiffs
motion for partial summary judgment consistent with the Court's ruling on October 1, 2007, the
Court hereby enters judgment as follows:
1.

In favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant in the principle amount of $61,362.43.

2.

Prejudgment interest at 10% per year (simple not compounded) from April 15, 2005

through October 1, 2007 in the amount of $15,128.48. ($6,136.24 per year; $16.80 per day for

two (2) years and 170 days.)
3.

Post-judgment interest at the statutory rate of 5.42% from commencing March 26,

2008, the date Judgment is entered.
4.

As the prevailing party and pursuant to the Parties' Agreement, Plaintiff is entitled to

its attorney fees and costs in the amount of $45,502,43. {See Affidavit of Attorney Fees and
Costs filed concurrently with this Proposed Final Judgment.)
5.

Total Judgment in the amount of $121,993.34.

6.

This Judgment shall be augmented in the amount of reasonable costs and attorney's

fees expended in collecting said judgment by execution or otherwise as shall be established by
affidavit, including the costs of appeal, pursuant to the contract at issue.
DATED this /Z-

day of

Jo

^^

, 20Q8.„,

THE HON©Rjy3LE
DISTRICT'
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the PROPOSED FINAL
JUDGMENT to be mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, this ^ /
following:
Scott B. Mitchell
SCOTT B. MITCHELL, PC
2469 East 7000 South, Suite 204
Salt Lake City, UT 84121
Attorney for defendant
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day of May, 2008, to the

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the ORDER to be faxed and
mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, this 20

day of March, 2008, to the following:

Scott B. Mitchell
SCOTT B. MITCHELL, PC
2469 East 7000 South, Suite 204
Salt Lake City, UT 84121
Attorney for defendant
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